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ABSTRACT
Private equity has transformed from a small asset class into a major
player in the global economy. Despite being a U.S. invention, the
private equity model has also managed to spread throughout Europe.
Recently, the spotlight has been put on the private equity industry for
a number of reasons: the recent financial crisis; the adoption of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the
U.S. and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the
E.U.; and the run of Mitt Romney, founder of the prestigious U.S.
private equity firm Bain Capital, for President of the United States.
Despite this attention, a comparative examination of private equity
regulation is absent from academic literature. This paper seeks to fill
that gap and offers a comparative assessment of the legal framework
governing private equity firms and transactions in both Europe and
the U.S. This comparative examination will reveal that Europe has a
particularly restrictive legal environment, which one would assume
would inhibit European private equity activity and cause it to
substantially lag behind the U.S. Nonetheless, underlying economic
forces have provided and continue to provide a boost to the
European market, allowing Europe to compete with the U.S. on an
equal footing. Unraveling these underlying economic forces shall be
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the other major goal of this paper. When it comes to European
private equity, there is no causation between the strictness of the
legal regime and economic development.
Rather, economic
development shapes its own path and is unaffected by the prevailing
legal regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Private equity has, for the first time, allowed ordinary citizens to act
as the “capitalist” during one of capitalism’s periodic frenzies of
“creative destruction.” This is giving the “little guy,” via his or her
pension fund, 80% of the upside in wealth creation that has
historically been the exclusive preserve of the Rockefellers and
1
Mellons of the world.

Thirty-four years after Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.
(“KKR”) raised the first ever private equity fund to finance leveraged
buyouts (“LBOs”),2 private equity firms are now widely regarded as the
new kings of capitalism.3 Fueled by an abundance of liquidity in the
financial system, private equity activity reached its greatest heights
between 2003 and 2007. The peak of this period came in 2007, when an
investor group led by KKR and Texas Pacific Group (“TPG”) completed
the buyout of TXU, which remains the biggest LBO in history.4 This
golden era ended with the bursting of the housing bubble and
subsequent credit crunch, which caused the collapse of the private
equity market as bidders tried to terminate or renegotiate their pending
acquisitions.5 Today, private equity activity has made some progress
towards recovering but is still far from its heyday; this can be attributed
to the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe as well as fragile debt
markets, which further strain deal financing and evidence the
dependency of private equity activity on credit market conditions. 6
1. Jenny Anderson, Stephen Schwarzman Speaks, DEALBOOK (Nov. 27, 2007,
8:04 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/stephen-schwarzman-speaks/.
2.
GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE
59 (1998).
3. The New Kings of Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/3398496.
4. In TXU’s $45 Billion Deal, Many Shades of Green, DEALBOOK (Feb. 26, 2007,
10:12 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/in-txus-45-billion-deal-manyshades-of-green/.
5. The total value of transactions terminated by private equity bidders exceeded
$168 billion. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in
Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default 2 (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540000.
6. Ulf Axelson et al., Borrow Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage
and Pricing in Buyouts, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596019.
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Nevertheless, the LBO association has managed to establish itself as a
dominant organizational form providing an attractive alternative to the
public corporation. Though Michael Jensen’s famed 1989 prediction
that the LBO association would eclipse the public corporation 7 never
materialized, the private equity model has successfully challenged the
predominance of the publicly held corporation.
Private equity, a U.S. invention, gained mainstream attention
during the takeover boom of the 1980s. According to Mitchell and
Mulherin, 57% of large U.S. firms were either takeover targets or
underwent a restructuring between 1982 and 1989.8 During this period,
private equity received negative criticism due to its association with
hostile takeovers and corporate bust-ups. However, in the years
following, the private equity industry managed to disassociate itself
from corporate raiders and their abusive practices, instead building the
profile of a cutting edge industry that would promote U.S. economic
growth. As a headquarter to many of the major industry players, the
U.S. private equity market remains the most mature market worldwide.
Nevertheless, buyout activity started spreading, particularly in Europe,
after 1996. 9 Between 2000 and 2004, Western Europe surpassed the
U.S. in buyout activity, accounting for 48.9% of worldwide transaction
value.10 The U.K. represents the most active European private equity
market both in terms of transaction value and volume, as the majority of
European and U.S. private equity firms operating in Europe are
headquartered there. The U.K.’s attractiveness is based on its stable and
favorable regulatory environment, sophisticated third-party advisers,
well-developed debt and equity capital markets, and positive attitude
towards entrepreneurial risk. Germany and France, the largest and
second largest European economies respectively, distantly follow the

7. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation 1–2 (1997)
(unpublished revision, originally published as Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the
Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=146149.
8. Mark L. Mitchell & Harold J. Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on
Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 (1996).
9. Mike Wright et al., Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe:
Retrospect and Prospect, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2006, at 38.
10. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 121, 128.
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U.K. 11 The underdevelopment of the private equity industry in
continental Europe is attributable to a lagging financial infrastructure,
unfavorable legal and fiscal environments for private equity
investments, a risk-averse culture, and thin equity markets.12 Europe
and the U.S. combined represent the majority of worldwide private
equity activity in terms of transaction value.13 In contrast, private equity
in emerging markets is either underdeveloped or employs a different
model than the US and Europe altogether.14
The aim of this article is twofold. The first aim is to offer a
comparative assessment of the legal framework governing the financing
and structuring of private equity transactions15 as well as the regulation
of private equity firms in Europe and the U.S. As this comparative
examination will reveal, private equity is subject to particularly stringent
requirements in Europe both on a transactional and, subsequent to the
adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
(“AIFM Directive”), fund manager level. One would therefore expect
that the legal regime would affect the development of the European
private equity market by inhibiting its activity and causing it to
substantially lag behind the U.S. market. The second aim of the article
is to both account for the past and predict the future of European private
equity. Despite the strict legal regime, private equity activity in Europe
11.
12.

Wright et al., supra note 9, at 38, 39.
Id. at 52–53. A well-developed stock market is important for a flourishing
private equity industry, since it offers private equity investors the possibility to exit
their investment through an initial public offering (“IPO”). See generally Bernard S.
Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 36.
13. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 121, 127.
14. For instance, while Brazil is one of the hottest markets for private equity firms,
the private equity model employed by Brazil relies less on debt financing and the
relevant deals usually involve minority acquisitions in medium-sized companies. See
Alternative Investments in Brazil: The Buys from Brazil, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 17,
2011, at 5, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18178275. In China, another
lucrative market for private equity, a wide variety of industries are considered to be
“strategic.” Therefore, controlling investments in these companies are either prohibited
or subject to governmental approval. As a result, private equity is confined to noncontrolling participations. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2010, at 3–4, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
17580583.
15. This article will concentrate on public-to-private transactions. A public-toprivate transaction involves the leveraged acquisition of a listed company that is
subsequently delisted from the stock exchange and transformed into a private company.
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has and will continue to grow at levels similar to those in the U.S. This
growth can be attributed to underlying economic forces.
The
development of the single market, introduction of the euro, growth of
European capital markets, liquidity boom in the European financial
system, financialization of Europe, and move towards the Anglo-Saxon
capitalist model has contributed to the growth of European private
equity activity, particularly during the last decade. While there are fears
that the adoption of the AIFM Directive will inhibit buyout activity in
Europe, underlying economic forces, albeit different from those that
drove the last boom, will fuel further growth of the European private
equity market. The current sovereign debt crisis in Europe will spark
vast reforms in European countries. These reforms, most notably labor
deregulation and privatizations, will provide a boost to European publicto-private activity.
The article will proceed as follows. Part I of this article will offer
an overview of private equity, the structure of a typical public-to-private
transaction, the history of private equity in the U.S. and certain
European countries, and the sources of value creation in LBOs. Part II
of the article will examine the legal rules governing the financing and
structuring of public-to-private transactions on both continents. Part III
of this article will be devoted to a comparative analysis of the regulation
of private equity firms in the U.S. and Europe, including an assessment
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) and the AIFM Directive. Part IV will offer an
account of the past and a prediction of the future of European private
equity, as well as seek to explain why its development remains
unaffected by the hostile European legal regime. We will attempt to
unravel the economic forces that have and will continue to provide a
boost to private equity activity, allowing Europe to compete with the
U.S. on an equal footing.

2013]

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY

619

I. PRIVATE EQUITY, ITS HISTORY, AND SOURCES OF VALUE CREATION
A. WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY?
Private equity is a generic term encompassing a wide variety of
The customary characteristic of private equity
investments. 16
investments is illiquidity, 17 since private equity involves unregistered
securities. 18 Private equity includes venture capital, development
capital, mezzanine capital, LBOs, and distressed investing.19 Venture
capital funds provide financing to start-ups and early stage firms,
thereby contributing to macroeconomic growth and job creation. 20
Development capital involves the provision of funds to existing

16. Private equity funds are different than hedge funds. While private equity funds
concentrate their investments in illiquid securities, hedge funds invest in publicly traded
securities pursuing short-term investment strategies. As it is often said, private equity is
focused on creating value. By contrast, hedge funds pursue an investment strategy of
finding value. However, recent years have seen the convergence of hedge funds and
private equity funds. In particular, hedge funds are increasingly making long-term
investments in public corporations and becoming involved in their corporate
governance. A recent phenomenon is hedge funds competing with private equity funds
to take companies private. See generally Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After
the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 NW. J. ’INT’L L.
& BUS. 603 (2009); Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the
Lines Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251 (2006);
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
244 (2008).
17. Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS.
ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 559, 564 (2011) (U.K.).
18. JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
NON-LISTED COMPANIES 171 (2008).
19. ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 7
(2006); PETER TEMPLE, PRIVATE EQUITY: EXAMINING THE NEW CONGLOMERATES OF
EUROPEAN BUSINESS 4 (1999). Private equity has diversified over time. Private
Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) are the latest innovation in the private equity
market. In a typical PIPE transaction, a public corporation will issue common stock or
securities convertible into common stock in a private placement to a private equity
investor. PIPE issuers are usually small cap companies with a weak stock price unable
to raise capital in the public equity markets. See CYRIL DEMARIA, INTRODUCTION TO
PRIVATE EQUITY 96 (2010); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 381, 386 (2007).
20. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2003).
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companies to support their expansion. 21 Mezzanine funds provide
financing to LBOs in the form of subordinated debt, with equity
participation in the form of warrants to subscribe for shares in the
borrower. 22 Distressed debt investors purchase debt of troubled
companies at a discount, and then use their rights as debtholders to
promote a restructuring of the company.23
The most well known category of private equity transactions is
LBOs. In a typical LBO, a private equity firm will acquire control of an
already existing business using a small amount of equity and a large
amount of debt. The transaction is defined as a public-to-private
transaction when the target of an LBO is a public company that is
subsequently delisted from the stock exchange and transformed into a
private company. Subcategories of LBOs are management buyouts,
management buy-ins, and institutional buyouts. In a management
buyout, the incumbent management will partner with a private equity
investor to privatize the company. Management will obtain a significant
stake in this new company. Conversely, in the case of a management
buy-in, an outside management team backed by a private equity investor
leads the bidding. In an institutional buyout, a private equity firm buys
a company, with its incumbent management typically receiving an
equity stake in the company as part of its remuneration package.24
21.
22.

TEMPLE, supra note 19, at 4.
Payne, supra note 17, at 569; GEOFF YATES & MIKE HINCHLIFFE, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS 193 (2010).
23. A popular strategy for distressed debt investors is to engage in loan-to-own
transactions, whereby investors acquire the debt of a company with a view to
converting it into equity and obtaining control of the company. An example of a
successful distressed debt investment was Yucaipa’s investment in the debt of Allied
Holdings, Inc. After Allied entered into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Yucaipa
purchased debt in the company and used its leverage as a debtholder to influence the
terms of Allied’s reorganization plan. Yucaipa emerged as the controlling shareholder
in the reorganized company by exchanging its debt for a controlling equity stake. See
Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of
Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 719–20 (2008).
24. In both a management buyout and an institutional buyout, the incumbent
management will end up with a stake in the acquired company. The difference lies in
the way that management obtains its equity stake. In the case of a management buyout,
the incumbent management gains its stake by being part of the bidding group, whereas
in the case of an institutional buyout the equity stake is granted to management as part
of its new remuneration package.
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Private equity investments are channeled through specialized
intermediaries that are usually organized as limited partnerships, 25
commonly known as private equity funds. Private equity firms such as
KKR, Blackstone, and TPG periodically establish private equity funds
in the form of limited partnerships 26 where they serve as general
partners. The general partner is responsible for managing the fund.
Furthermore, the general partner solicits capital from investors, who are
the limited partners of these funds.27 The principal investors in private
equity funds are institutional investors such as pension funds, 28
university endowments, insurance companies, and banks, as well as
wealthy individuals. 29 Private equity firms usually invest a certain

25. The preference for investing in an issuer through intermediaries rather than by
direct investment is based on the complexity of private equity investments. The
extensive pre-screening and post-investment monitoring required for private equity
investments are more efficiently performed by specialized intermediaries, rather than by
a large number of outside investors. See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STAFF SERIES 168, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY
MARKET 28 (1995).
26. Funds are organized as limited partnerships in order to take advantage of the
pass-through tax treatment of partnership profits. Tax liability on partnership profits is
not incurred at the entity level, but is rather passed on to the individual investor. See
Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133, 136
(2003).
27. Investors commit to provide capital to the private equity fund. Once an
investment opportunity is identified, the fund manager sends a notification to the
investors and draws down committed capital equal to the amount required for the
specific investment. See Per Strömberg, The Economic and Social Impact of Private
Equity in Europe: Summary of Research Findings 4 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429322.
28. Public pension funds have been a major source of financing for private equity
firms. See Steven M. Davidoff, Wall St.’s Odd Couple and Their Quest to Unlock
Riches, DEALBOOK (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/
13/wall-st-s-odd-couple-and-their-quest-to-unlock-riches/ (describing private equity
firms’ love affair with public pension funds).
29. In order to avoid securities regulation, private equity funds are closed to retail
investors and offered solely to “sophisticated” investors. However, recent years have
seen the rise of what Steven Davidoff refers to as “black market capital.” Recently
emerging capital market phenomena such as special purpose acquisition companies
(SPACs), business development corporations (BDCs), and exchange traded funds
(ETFs) seek to replicate private equity. SPACs raise funds through an IPO in order to
complete acquisitions of private companies by employing structures and practices
comparable to private equity. BDCs invest in debt securities associated with private
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amount of capital into the fund 30 in order to ensure an alignment of
interests with the other fund investors.31 Such funds are “closed-end”
vehicles, meaning that investors cannot withdraw their capital during the
life of the fund.32 The funds have a fixed life, typically of ten years with
the possibility of a two-year extension. Therefore, private equity firms
must regularly return to the market and raise new capital. To do this, the
firms must have earned a reputation for delivering superior returns in
their previous funds.33
Private equity firms are responsible for managing the fund as
general partners, as well as selecting and managing the investments.
During the first three to five years of the fund’s life—the investment
period—the private equity firm will deploy its capital to acquire
companies. During the remaining years of the fund’s life—the holding
period—the private equity firm manages and eventually sells the
investments.
The compensation of the general partner consists of an annual
management fee and a share of the fund’s profits, known as carried
interest. The management fee usually amounts to 2% of all capital and
the carried interest is commonly set at 20% of the fund’s profits. 34 The
carried interest is typically claimed after the investors’ capital has been
returned and a designated rate of return called the hurdle rate, typically

equity transactions while ETFs can track private equity performance. See generally
Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008).
30. Usually 1% of the total capital. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 123.
31. See Payne, supra note 17, at 563.
32. The illiquidity of investments in private equity funds has been remedied by the
rise of a secondary market in limited partnership interests. Subject to the general
partner’s approval, investors in private equity funds are able to transfer their partnership
interests in the secondary market.
33. This high-powered incentive of private equity firms to show good performance
is being compromised by the public listing of private equity firms. A public listing
allows private equity fund managers to obtain permanent capital and, therefore, makes
the raising of new funds in the market unnecessary. See Michael C. Jensen, The
Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some Concerns) (Harvard NOM Working
Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=963530.
34. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
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set at 8%, has been achieved.35 In addition, private equity firms charge
monitoring and deal fees on the companies in which they invest.36
Though limited partners benefit from the fact that their liability is
capped at the amount of their invested capital in the fund, their inability
to participate in the fund’s management exposes them to the
opportunistic behavior of the general partner. Partnership agreements
regulating the relationship between general and limited partners contain
a number of provisions seeking to restrain the general partner’s
discretion. These covenants include: limits on the amount the fund can
invest in a single company, restrictions on the types of assets that the
fund can purchase, and restrictions on the general partner’s outside
activities.37 In addition, private equity firms periodically provide reports
to the limited partners detailing the value and progress of the fund’s
portfolio. 38 Private equity funds also establish special advisory
committees with the participation of limited partners.39
B. THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING OF A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND’S
PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTION
In order to complete a public-to-private transaction, a private equity
buyer will create a special purpose vehicle with no material assets to
acquire the target company. The private equity fund will not be a party
to the transaction and therefore avoids any liabilities. Τhe fund will
control the acquisition vehicle, subscribe shares in it, and make an
additional investment through a loan note in the vehicle.40 Management
35. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRIVATE EQUITY: A DISCUSSION OF RISK AND REGULATORY
ENGAGEMENT 24 ¶ 3.16 (2006). It is often argued that since the size of the carried
interest depends on performance, carried interest creates a powerful incentive for
private equity fund managers to achieve good returns. See Fleischer, supra note 34, at
8. However, in reality, the general partner derives the majority of its compensation from
fixed revenue components, namely, management and transaction fees. Only one-third
of the general partner’s compensation is performance-based and derived from the
carried interest. See Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private
Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2327–28 (2010).
36.
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 35, at 2314.
37. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J. L. & ECON. 463, 479–84 (1996).
38. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON.. 473, 492 (1990).
39. Id. at 493.
40. YATES & HINCHLIFFE, supra note 22, at 50.
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will also subscribe to shares in the vehicle, though it will be a small
fraction of the total equity component.41 The capital raised, along with
debt, will be used to finance the purchase of a public company. The
target company’s shareholders will receive cash and retain no interest in
the post-acquisition company.
In a public-to-private transaction, between 60% and 70% of the
purchase price is funded by debt. 42 In the years prior to the 2008
financial crisis (“Financial Crisis”), the availability of debt increased
significantly and the secondary market for bank debt buoyed, which
helped contribute to the LBO boom.43 Another hallmark of these golden
years was the rise and expansion of the collateralized loan obligation
(“CLO”) market.44 These two markets allowed banks to unload risky
loans from their balance sheets, raising concerns about their monitoring
and screening incentives.45
Another result of the overly liquid and relaxed lending standards
was the emergence of “covenant-lite” loans and “payment-in-kind”
toggle notes. In a typical loan transaction, the lender will impose
financial covenants on the borrower, such as a requirement to maintain
monthly or quarterly performance standards. Covenant-lite loans part
with maintenance covenants and instead include looser incurrence

41.
42.

Id. at 52.
In the wake of the Financial Crisis, a growing number of deals are financed
solely through equity. Examples include Apax Partner’s acquisition of Bankrate and
Apollo’s acquisition of Parallel Petroleum. See Steven M. Davidoff, Bankrate: A New
Model for Private Equity Deals, DEALBOOK (July 24, 2009, 1:02 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/bankrate-a-new-model-for-private-equitydeals/; Steven M. Davidoff, New Model Emerging for Private Equity Deals, DEALBOOK
(Sept. 16, 2009, 2:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/new-modelemerging-for-private-equity-deals/.
43. Viral Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom or Bust?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Fall 2007, at 44.
44. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Debt Market’s Slow Recovery is Burdened by New
Regulation, DEALBOOK (Jan. 31, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
01/31/a-debt-markets-slow-recovery-is-burdened-by-new-regulation/. A collateralized
loan obligation is a debt security issued by a special purpose vehicle and backed by
loans extended to finance leveraged buyouts. The debt securities are divided in several
tranches with different maturity, interest and repayment schedules. See Anil Shivdasani
& Yihui Wang, Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?, 66 J. FIN. 1291, 1295
(2011).
45. Acharya et al., supra note 43, at 3.
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covenants, allowing the borrower to take a variety of actions such as
paying a dividend and incurring additional debt so long as a certain
threshold has not been exceeded.46
Private equity firms Warburg Pincus LLC and TPG were the first to
use payment-in-kind toggle notes during their buyout of luxury retailer
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. 47 These securities allow issuers to pay
interest to lenders or note holders either in cash or by issuing more
securities (in-kind).
The debt component of a typical public-to-private transaction
includes senior debt, second-lien debt, mezzanine debt, and high-yield
bonds. Senior debt comprises the majority of the debt incurred in an
LBO transaction, is secured by the target’s assets and shares on a firstranking basis, and is divided into three separate term loans and a
revolving facility. The term loans are used to fund the purchase price,
whereas the revolving facility is used to fund the target’s workingcapital requirements.
Second-lien debt developed in the U.S. during the 1990s and is
secured by the same assets or shares as senior debt, though it ranks
secondary to senior debt in priority. Hedge funds have historically been
the main investors in second-lien debt,48 though a variety of institutional
investors, including banks, are increasingly becoming involved in this
type of financing.49
Mezzanine debt is subordinate to senior debt as well, and carries a
higher interest rate to compensate lenders for their inferior position in
case of the issuer defaults. 50 Mezzanine lenders usually obtain share
46. Financial covenants can be separated in two broad categories: maintenance and
incurrence covenants. Maintenance covenants, which are used in most credit
agreements, require the borrower to adhere to a financial ratio test at regular intervals,
usually at the end of each quarter. On the contrary, incurrence covenants oblige the
borrower to meet a financial ratio test upon the occurrence of an event such as the
incurrence of additional debt. Incurrence covenants are common to high yield bonds.
See A Beginner’s Guide to Thinking About Covenants, BANKING AND FINANCE MARKET
SNAPSHOT, (Kramer Levin), Dec. 2006, at 2.
47. Henny Sender, What’s Aiding Buyout Boom: Toggle Notes, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 2007, at C1.
48. LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 669 (2011).
49. Id.
50. While both second-lien and mezzanine debt are subordinate to senior debt,
second-lien debt benefits from a second-ranking security on the borrower’s assets. On
the contrary, mezzanine capital is typically unsecured. See Arthur D. Robinson et al.,
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warrants, allowing them to subscribe for shares in the portfolio company
under certain circumstances, such as a sale or IPO.
High-yield bonds are another important source of financing for
LBOs. These debt securities were developed and perfected by the
infamous Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham and Lambert. They are
mainly purchased by institutional investors, are rated below investment
grade, and usually carry a fixed interest rate. A crucial advantage of
high-yield bonds is the inclusion of more flexible incurrence-based
covenants, rather than covenants requiring the borrower to maintain
ongoing financial capital ratios.
Once the financing has been put in place, a private equity fund,
acting through the acquisition vehicle, will complete the target
acquisition and transform the company into a privately held company.
After the target company has gone “dark”, the private equity investors
will work with management to increase the target company’s value.
A private equity fund’s fixed duration motivates its managers to
quickly restructure their portfolio companies and exit their investments.
The main exit strategies for private equity investors are the sale of a
portfolio company to a strategic buyer, called a trade sale; an initial
public offering; a sale to another private equity fund, called a secondary
buyout; or a leveraged dividend recapitalization.51
C. THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
In the U.S., the modern LBO model traces its roots back to the late
1960s. While at Bear Stearns, Jerome Kohlberg, Henry Kravis, and
George Roberts established a unit that specialized in LBOs of private

Mezzanine Finance: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW – THE JOURNAL (Feb. 2013), available
at http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46116602D7EAD896B179
&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281AED996A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899.
51. In a leveraged dividend recapitalization, the portfolio company will issue debt
and use the proceeds to pay a special dividend to the private equity investors. Dividend
recapitalizations have been heavily criticized for allowing private equity investors to
reap a quick profit while saddling the portfolio company with more debt. See Ryan
Dezember & Matt Wirz, Debt Fuels a Dividend Boom. WALL ST. J., October 19, 2012,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578064672995
070116.html.
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family firms.52 In 1976, the trio decided to leave Bear Stearns and form
the first-ever private equity firm, KKR.53 KKR raised its first private
equity fund devoted to financing public-to-private buyouts in 1978. The
buyout of Houdaille Industries, completed in 1979, was the first LBO of
a large public company. 54 The successful closing of the deal soon
attracted attention, and imitations followed.
The development of a liquid high-yield debt market was pioneered
by Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, and contributed to the
LBO boom of the 1980s. The privatization of RJR Nabisco highlighted
the excesses of the era. Political backlash against highly leveraged
transactions, tightened credit markets, and the collapse of the high-yield
debt market put an end to the boom, and the 1990s saw a substantial
decline in U.S. LBO activity.55 However, the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act (“SOX”) on corporate governance increased the costs of
being a public company56 and provided a boost to private equity activity,
which resumed in 1997. The period between 2003 and 2007 saw a
meteoric rise in private equity activity, and firms such as KKR,
Blackstone, and TPG executed multi-billion dollar public-to-private
transactions. This wave of public-to-private transactions is attributable
to vast inflows of capital into private equity funds, easy credit, and
public company CEO’s growing receptiveness to private equity. 57
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis caused the collapse of the U.S. private
equity market and revealed deep flaws in its structure.58 In the aftermath
52. BAKER & SMITH, supra note 2, at 52; Allen Kaufman & Ernest J. Englander,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the Restructuring of American Capitalism, 67 BUS.
HIST. REV. 52, 67–68 (1993).
53. Kaufman & Englander, supra note 52, at 67–68.
54. Id. at 71.
55. In addition, U.S. corporations’ adoption of shareholder-friendly policies by
U.S. corporations, such as the rise of incentive-based compensation and active
monitoring of management by institutional investors, made LBOs unnecessary. See
Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001,
at 132–36.
56. For a criticism of SOX, see generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
57. Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity: Past, Present and Future, 19 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2007).
58. An innovation of the private equity golden era was the reverse termination fee.
Private equity buyers were able to back out of a deal by paying a fee to the target
company. This made the completion of deals optional. ’ Thus, during the financial
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of the Financial Crisis, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is still
causing tight credit markets that constrain U.S. private equity activity.
Within Europe, private equity was first developed in the U.K.,
which experienced a buyout boom during the 1980s. An important
development that contributed to the boom was a change in the U.K.’s
legislative framework; prior to 1981, it was illegal for a target company
to grant a security to a bidder for the purpose of acquiring its own
shares.59 The Companies Act of 1981 allowed the granting of securities
subject to the fulfillment of certain requirements.60 The buyout boom
ended with the recession of the early 1990s. However, private equity
activity eventually resumed, reaching a peak in 2000 before declining
due to the dot-com bubble bursting and the repercussions that followed.
The last buyout boom in the U.K. started in 2003 and lasted until the
onset of the financial crisis in 2007. In 2007, Alliance Boots went
private with the help of KKR and its largest shareholder, Stefano
Pessina. This was the first ever public-to-private transaction involving a
FTSE 100 company, and was the largest buyout in Europe to date.61
LBO activity in continental Europe never reached the maturity and
depth of the U.S. or U.K. markets, but there were still periods when the
private equity market thrived. The first LBO boom came during the late
1980s, followed by a dormant market during the early 1990s. Activity
picked up again in the late 1990s, and 2003 marked the start of the
golden era of private equity in continental Europe. Two of the biggest
public-to-private transactions in continental Europe—the buyout of
Danish telecommunications giant TDC and the leveraged acquisition of
a controlling stake in the semiconductor unit of Royal Philips
Electronics—both took place in 2006.62 As far as individual European
crisis, private equity firms were able to easily terminate their pending acquisitions. See
generally Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481
(2009).
59.
JOHN GILLIGAN & MIKE WRIGHT, ICAEW CORPORATE FINANCE FACULTY,
PRIVATE EQUITY DEMYSTIFIED—AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE 16 (2d ed. 2010).
60. GILLIGAN & WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 16.
61. Julia Finch, Pessina Wins the Battle for Boots, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/apr/25/privateequity.retail.
62.
See Telis Demos, NXP Semiconductor Launches Secondary Offering, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/aa0d191a-57c7-11e0-9abf00144feab49a.html#axzz1yMhK70Mn; Heather Timmons, TDC Joins Spree of E.U.
Buyouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/business/
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countries are concerned, Germany and France represent the largest
individual private equity markets in continental Europe, due in part to
the size of their economies.
The birth of the LBO model in Germany has been attributed to the
existence of family offices, which provided the necessary initial capital
for the first LBOs.63 Private equity activity remained subdued until the
late 1990s and mostly concentrated on the so-called Mittelstand
companies,64 which form the backbone of the German economy. 1997
was a landmark year for private equity in Germany. 65 Major
corporations started spinning off underperforming businesses, while
executives became more receptive to private equity buyouts.66 The dot
com bubble caused private equity activity in Germany to slow down
considerably, but the market quickly picked up; between 2004 and 2007,
the number of LBOs grew exponentially. 67 However, the German
market was not immune to the Financial Crisis, which caused a
substantial drop in German private equity activity.
While the U.S. and the U.K. were experiencing their LBO booms
during the 1980s, private equity remained largely unknown in France for
a better part of the decade. Certain buyout shops, including LBO France
established in 1985, led the way and started utilizing the LBO model to
take over small family businesses.68 The private equity market in France
grew substantially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a number
of U.K. buyout firms opening offices in Paris.69 However, it was not
until the early 2000s that France experienced an LBO boom, fueled by
the willingness of banks to lend, the rise of the junk bond market, and
the flow of institutional investor funds into private equity.70 Two of the
worldbusiness/30iht-tdc.html?_r=1.
63. PAUL JOWETT & FRANCOISE JOWETT, PRIVATE EQUITY: THE GERMAN
EXPERIENCE 75 (2011).
64. The term “Mittelstand” refers to family-owned small and medium-sized
German businesses. See Brian Blackstone & Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Engines of
Growth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703509104576329643153915516.html.
65. JOWETT & JOWETT, supra note 63, at 300.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 426.
68. David Carey, The Downstroke of PE in France, DEAL MAG., Feb. 17, 2012,
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/044719/features/the-downstroke-of-pe-infrance.php.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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biggest buyouts in French history—the acquisition of a controlling block
in PagesJaunes and the LBO of Rexel—were completed between 2006
and 2007. 71 Although the French market was not immune from the
Financial Crisis, it is interesting to note that the French buyout market
rebounded quickly and France still remains a dominant force in the
European private equity market.
D. SOURCES OF VALUE CREATION IN LBOS
After a buyout has been completed, private equity firms work
alongside management to increase the value of the company and reap
any profit generated by successfully exiting their investment via a trade
sale, a secondary buyout, or a flotation. Various explanations have been
offered for the sources of value creation in LBOs.
1. Corporate Governance Engineering
In their seminal book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property,72 Berle and Means observed that separation of ownership and
control plagued the modern publicly held corporation.73 This separation
creates an agency problem, as the interests of diffuse principalshareholders and agent-managers often diverge.74 Shareholders want to
maximize the profit of the firm, while managers tend to be risk averse,
prone to slack, and interested in maximizing the size of the firm.
71. See Jason Singer, France Télécom Will Sell Its Stake in Yellow Pages to KKR,
Goldman, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB115367846787314758.html?mod=home_whats_news_us; Peter Smith, Rexel Picks
Four Banks for Float, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
4361d36e-55a0-11db-acba-0000779e2340.html#axzz1yMhK70Mn.
72. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
73. Id. at 355; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
74. REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 22 (2004). This separation of ownership
and control offers important benefits as well. Shareholders specializing in risk bearing
are able to profit from business opportunities even though they lack managerial skills.
All the same, managers without significant personal wealth can also pursue profitable
ventures. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
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Agency costs 75 arise as a result. Private equity has been praised for
applying governance mechanisms that reduce these costs.76
Private equity investors ensure an alignment of managerial and
shareholder interests by giving management substantial ownership
positions in portfolio companies through stocks and options. In
addition, investors require the management team to invest a significant
part of their personal wealth in the company. Executives in charge of
running the company have a strong incentive to perform because they
will profit heavily from any upside, but will also stand to lose part of
their personal wealth in case of suboptimal performance.
Another mechanism that reduces agency costs is the highly
indebted structure of companies acquired through LBO transactions.
Michael Jensen has pointed out the agency costs generated by free cash
flow;77 for example, managers have an incentive to spend excess cash
flow in negative present value projects. By issuing debt, managers are
bonding their promise to pay out future excess cash flows instead of
using them inefficiently. In addition, the threat of bankruptcy resulting
from failure to meet interest and principal repayments motivates the
management team to run the company efficiently.
After an LBO, the private equity investor will end up holding a
majority stake in the target company. The creation of a large
stakeholder provides both stronger incentives and more information to
75. Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as the sum of (a) the costs incurred in
monitoring the agents, which are borne by shareholders; (b) the bonding costs incurred
by managers; and (c) the residual loss incurred due to divergence between the
manager’s decisions and the decisions that would maximize shareholder welfare. See
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
76. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 219, 227 (2009). However, one should note that governance engineering applies
solely to publicly held corporations with a diffuse ownership structure. This corporate
model is prevalent in the U.S. and U.K. On the contrary, corporations in Continental
Europe are dominated by controlling shareholders that are able to effectively monitor
management. Therefore, corporate governance engineering is unlikely to be a source of
value creation in buyouts involving corporations in Continental Europe. See AnnKristin Achleitner et al., Private Equity Acquisitions of Continental European Firms:
The Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood of Being Taken Private, 19
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 72, 73–74 (2013).
77. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).

632

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

monitor management. In addition, the private equity investor will
appoint its nominees to the company’s board of directors and obtain
majority control. The boards of private equity companies tend to be
smaller and meet more frequently than those of public companies,78 and
are thus considered to be more effective. Unlike public boards, which
are often preoccupied with governance and risk management, private
equity boards are more focused on strategic leadership and value
creation.79
2. Operational Engineering
In recent years, private equity firms have focused on what Steven
Kaplan refers to as operational engineering.80 By applying industry and
operating expertise, they strive to improve the operating performance of
portfolio companies. In order to achieve this improvement, private
equity firms organize into industry groups and seek to recruit
professionals with relevant operating and industry expertise. Indeed,
these strategies have proven to be successful, as studies concerning
different countries have found that buyouts result in significant
operating improvements.81
3. Tax Savings
Apart from the beneficial use of debt in reducing agency costs
associated with the use of free cash flow, debt also carries important tax
78. Francesca Cornelli & Oğuzhan Karakaş, Corporate Governance of LBOs: The
Role of Boards 12 (May 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1875649.
79. Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity vs. PLC Boards in the U.K.: A
Comparison of Practices and Effectiveness, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2009, at 45.
80. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 11.
81. In a study of U.S. public-to-private transactions during the 1980s, Kaplan
found that the operating margin of portfolio companies increased by between 10% to
20% and cash flow margin increased by almost 40%. See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of
Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217
(1989). In addition, Harris et al., in their study of management buyouts in the U.K.,
show that private equity-backed companies experienced a substantial increase in total
factor productivity after the buyout. See Richard Harris et al., Assessing the Impact of
Management Buyouts on Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United
Kingdom, 87 REV. ECON. STAT. 148 (2005).
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benefits. The tax deductibility of interest generates tax shields. Kaplan
shows that between 1980 and 1986, U.S. public-to-private transactions
generated tax benefits equal to between 21% and 143% of the premium
paid to pre-buyout shareholders. 82 LBOs have been particularly
criticized for causing substantial tax losses to the state. However,
Jensen et al. examines the effects of buyouts on tax revenues of the U.S.
Treasury and finds that buyouts actually result in increased tax
revenues.83
4. Wealth Expropriation from Other Stakeholders
Shleifer and Summers famously argued that wealth gains caused by
LBOs are attributable to the breach of implicit contracts between a
corporation and its employees.84 Firms enter into implicit contracts with
employees who, in exchange for lifetime employment, agree to lower
wages. The firm can profit by breaching these implicit contracts and
firing workers. LBOs have attracted strong criticism for reducing the
number of employees in target companies.85 However, various studies
suggest that the effect of LBOs on employment is minimal. Davis et al.
studied a sample of U.S. LBOs that took place between 1980 and 2005
and found that employment levels in target firms declined after

82. Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value,
44 J. FIN. 611 (1989).
83. See Michael C. Jensen et al., Effects of LBOs on Taxes Revenues of the U.S.
Treasury, 42 TAX NOTES 727 (1989). The sources of increased tax revenues are the
capital gains taxes imposed on pre-buyout shareholders, taxes on interest income earned
by creditors financing the transaction, and capital gains taxes resulting from asset sales
following the buyout. Furthermore, LBO firms show an increase in operating income
resulting in added tax revenues. Moreover, LBOs eliminate wasteful capital
expenditures. The funds saved are returned to shareholders who can invest them in
positive net present value projects, creating an additional source of tax revenues. The
resulting increased revenues offset the tax losses generated by interest deductions and
reduced dividends.
84. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 53 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988).
85. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., All the G.O.P.’s Gekkos, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2011, at A39, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/opinion/krugman-allthe-gops-gekkos.html?_r=1.
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buyouts.86 However, target companies rapidly created new jobs at new
establishments, so that the overall net job losses were less than 1% of
the initial employment levels.87 In another study concerning the impact
of LBOs on employment in the U.K., Amess et al. found that private
equity-backed acquisitions have no significant impact on wages and
employment.88
Another common explanation for the source of gains in private
equity-backed acquisitions is that they expropriate value from prebuyout bondholders through a large increase in the debt of the target
company. However, the evidence does not support this view. Even
though pre-existing bonds’ ratings are often downgraded after a
leveraged buyout, the value of the bonds does not actually decrease.89
II. THE FINANCING AND STRUCTURING OF PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE
TRANSACTIONS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
A. SOME DIFFERENCES IN FINANCING PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
1. The Certain Funds Requirement
A public-to-private deal is mostly financed by debt. A bank’s
commitment to lend is usually made at the time the acquisition
agreement is signed or the bid is launched, while the actual funding
happens at the closing of the transaction. This period between signing
and closing can be particularly long, especially in cases where antitrust
or other regulatory approvals are required. The circumstances of a
lender may thus change after a commitment to lend is made, which leads
to heavy negotiations between lenders and borrowers about conditions
86. Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity and Employment 31-34 (U.S. Census
Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. CES-WP-08-07R, 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107175.
87. Id.
88. Kevin Amess et al., What are the Wage and Employment Consequences of
Leveraged Buyouts, Private Equity and Acquisitions in the U.K.? 17 (Nottingham Univ.
Bus. Sch. Research Paper Series No. 01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270581.
89. See Laurentius Marais, Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Wealth Effects of
Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 155, 159 (1989).
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precedent to funding. An essential difference between U.S. and
European acquisition finance is the “certain funds” requirement
prevalent in most European jurisdictions. The purpose of the certain
funds requirement is to preclude highly conditional and speculative
offers. The U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover
Code”),90 which governs takeovers of U.K. public companies, was the
first to introduce the certain funds requirement. A majority of European
jurisdictions have followed the U.K. approach and introduced the
requirement as well. General Principle 5 of the Takeover Code provides
that “[a]n offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she
can fulfill in full any cash consideration.” 91 Accordingly, Rule 24.8
provides that when an offer is for cash, 92 the offer document must
include “confirmation” by the offeror’s bank or financial adviser that
sufficient resources are available to the offeror to satisfy acceptance of
the offer.93 Financial advisers will thus have to ascertain that the bidder
has adequate cash to implement the offer.
In order to satisfy the certain funds requirement, the lending bank
cannot impose onerous funding conditions on the offeror to provide the
bank an escape hatch to funding. Yet, lenders are able to refuse the
disbursement of funds for a limited set of conditions; current market
practice is that lenders can deny funding only in cases of illegality or for
matters that are solely within the control of the bidder.94 For instance,
banks are not able to refuse the advancement of funds in the case of a
“material[ly] adverse change in the target group.” 95 To satisfy the
certain funds requirement, the bidder and the lender must enter into a
signed loan agreement at the time the offer is announced or the
agreement signed.96 Commitment letters or heads of terms agreements,

90. THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (10th ed. 2011) (U.K.),
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf
[hereinafter TAKEOVER CODE].
91. Id. § B.5.
92. This is always the case in private equity acquisitions since the bidder will want
to ensure that target shareholders do not participate in the post-acquisition company.
93. TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 90, at § I(24.8).
94. John D. Markland, How Certain Can You Get?, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, April
2007.
95. Id.
96. See When Will a Commitment Letter Constitute a Firm Commitment? Some
Thoughts on the Clear Channel Litigation from a U.K. Perspective, FINANCING
BRIEFING (Slaughter & May), July 2008, at 1, 2.
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which are commonplace in U.S. acquisition finance, will not suffice
under the certain funds requirement.
Banks in the U.S. are accustomed to insisting on a broad range of
funding conditions as part of the negotiation between the lender and the
acquirer. Nonetheless, in recent years, U.S. banks have been “willing to
provide more certain financing terms.”97
The buyout of SunGard Data Systems significantly changed the
structure of private equity deals.98 Under the SunGard approach, private
equity bidders no longer have a financing condition in the purchase
agreement, meaning they are obligated to fund the acquisition even if
financing is not available. However, purchasers now insist that the
conditions to funding in the commitment letter are reciprocal to those in
the acquisition agreement. By aligning the conditions in the debt
commitment letter with the ones in the acquisition agreement, the
purchaser is protected from the possibility of having to complete the
acquisition even though the lenders are excused from performance.
The certain funds requirement imposed by European countries
obligates banks to provide financing for a transaction, subject only to
limited funding conditions. As a result, banks are forced to bear the risk
of market deterioration between the time that the acquisition agreement
is signed or the offer launched, and the closing of the transaction.
Therefore, banks are likely to demand compensation for this additional
risk by charging a higher interest rate on the funds lent. As a result, the
transaction will have to be funded with more expensive debt,
diminishing the returns of private equity bidders.
2. Debt Subordination
The financing package of a public-to-private transaction involves
different types of debt. A typical public-to-private transaction will be
financed with senior bank debt, as well as one or both of mezzanine or
high-yield debt. Junior debt, namely mezzanine debt and high-yield, is
subordinated to senior bank debt. A crucial difference between U.S. and
European acquisition finance is the means by which such subordination
is achieved. While subordination in the U.S. is achieved contractually,
97. David J. Sorkin & Eric M. Swedenburg, Recent U.S. Deals Depart from
Traditional Financing, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2006, at 103.
98. See Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, supra note 58, at 495.
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uncertainty regarding the enforceability of contractual subordination in
Europe has obliged legal practitioners to effect such subordination
structurally.
In a U.S. public-to-private deal, the various categories of debt are
loaned to a single entity and debt holder priority is determined by an
intercreditor agreement. Α common subordination provision is the
prohibition of payments to junior creditors in case of a payment default
on senior debt. Only once this payment default is cured or waived may
the borrower resume making payments to junior creditors. Furthermore,
in case of any other breach of a senior obligation such as a breach of a
covenant, the senior lenders have the right to prohibit the borrower from
making any payments to junior creditors for a period of time, usually
179 days. 99 Unless the senior creditors elect to accelerate their
indebtedness, the issuer will resume payments on the bonds after the
passage of this period of time.
In Europe, subordination is achieved structurally. Junior creditors
will extend financing to a parent company with no assets other than
shares in operating subsidiaries. Senior lenders will make their loans to
operating subsidiaries with title to business assets, and thus benefit from
collateral on these assets. As a result, if the parent and its subsidiaries
both become insolvent, the junior creditors’ recovery will be limited to
any amounts paid as distribution on the equity of the parent company.
Junior creditors’ claims will be effectively subordinated to the senior
lenders’ claims against the subsidiaries holding the underlying business
assets. A major shortcoming of structural subordination is the fact that
junior creditors’ claims will also be subordinated to the claims of the
subsidiary’s other creditors, such as trade creditors.
Structural subordination of debt has given rise to one of the most
rigorous debates in European acquisition finance. In 2002, European
high-yield investors threatened to boycott future high-yield debt
offerings. 100 These investors felt vulnerable because of their weak
bargaining position in case of insolvency, which was attributable to the
structural subordination of their claims as well as weak recovery rates

99. William J. Wheelan, III, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics, in
LEVERAGED FINANCIAL MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO HIGH-YIELD BONDS,
LOANS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 171, 175 (William F. Maxwell & Mark R. Shenkman
eds. 2010).
100. Richard A. Ginsburg, European High Yield- Bondholder Insubordination,
PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal & Manges), Apr. 2004, at 1.
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on defaulted bonds. This threat materialized in the 2003 high-yield
offering for the acquisition of LeGrand, a French industrial group. 101
High-yield investors demanded guarantees from operating subsidiaries,
and then boycotted the issue when the company rejected their demand.
The issue was eventually brought to the market, but at a higher interest
rate. The LeGrand issue forced market participants to reevaluate the
financing structure of European leveraged buyouts. After LeGrand,
granting credit support in the form of guarantees from the operating
subsidiaries of the high-yield borrower became the norm in European
high-yield issuances102
The European market practice of structurally subordinating the
claims of various debt categories requires specialist legal advice. Such
specialists would be expected to advise on the formation of different
corporate entities, as well as complex negotiations between senior
lenders and high-yield bondholders demanding credit support to
improve their ranking in case of borrower insolvency. As a result,
significant transaction costs often arise for parties structuring private
equity transactions in Europe.
3. Ban on Financial Assistance
The European Second Council Directive of December 13, 1976
(“Second Directive”) 103 introduced the legal capital doctrine, the
mandatory rules which seek to protect creditors from shareholder
opportunism.104 The Second Directive obligates Member States of the
European Union to impose a minimum capital requirement on
companies, restrict shareholder distributions such as dividend payments
and share-buybacks, and ban a target company from granting financial
101.
Bryant Edwards, Innovation Fuels Europe’s High-yield Market, INT’L FIN. L.
REV. Mar. 2005, at 28, 31.
102. Id.
103. Second Council Directive 77/91,1976 O.J. (L 26) (EC) [hereinafter Second
Council Directive].
104. Shareholders may “benefit themselves at the expense of the creditors in a
number of ways.” GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 48, at 116. For example, they may
withdraw assets from the firm by making distributions to themselves (asset diversion);
authorize additional debt in such a way as to increase the risk profile of the firm and
limit the pre-existing creditors’ recovery (claim dilution); or abandon projects with a
positive net value that only benefit debt holders (underinvestment). See id.
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assistance for the purpose of acquiring its own shares.105 The mandatory
nature of the Second Directive is in sharp contrast to the U.S. approach
to creditor protection. In the U.S., creditors protect themselves from
exploitation using contract law, not corporate law.106
Article 23 of the Second Directive is of utmost importance for
public-to-private transactions. Article 23 prohibits public companies
from granting financial assistance to third parties for the acquisition of
the public companies’ shares, through the provision of loans or security
over their assets.107 Some criticize this prohibition for impeding buyout
transactions in situations where the bidder intends to use the target’s
assets to secure debt necessary to finance the acquisition. However,
these financial assistance rules are designed to prevent asset-stripping
takeovers and protect pre-existing creditors from the risks that LBOs
pose by incurring additional debt. 108 Directive 2006/68/EC, which
amended the Second Directive, relaxed the prohibition on financial
assistance and permitted it subject to the fulfillment of certain
requirements, such as the ex ante approval of the transaction by
shareholders, the occurrence of the transaction at fair market conditions,
and the investigation of the third party’s credit standing. 109 However,
105. A detailed examination of the Second Directive is beyond the scope of this
article. For an overview of the Directive and related criticism, see generally Luca
Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditor Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against
the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001).
106. See id. at 1173. The U.S. approach can be seen as a manifestation of the
contractual theory of the firm. According to this prevalent American economic theory,
the firm is viewed as a “nexus of contracts” among participants in the organization such
as shareholders, employees, and creditors. These participants should be allowed to
structure their relations, as they desire. Mandatory rules are seen as an intrusion on the
freedom to contract. Thus, the state’s role should be limited to enforcing these
contracts and providing default rules that the parties can alter. See generally R. H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996); Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature
of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983).
107. See Second Council Directive 77/91, art. 23, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1, 8.
108. See John Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a
Modern Company Law, 63 MOD. L. REV. 355, 368–69 (2000).
109. Council Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 September 2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC regarding the formation
of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital,
art. 1, 2006 O.J (L 264) 32, 33–35.
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this relaxation has proven pointless, since a private equity bidder is still
deterred by the costs and time associated with meeting these
requirements.
Despite the ban on financial assistance, Europe has seen a
remarkable rise in LBO activity, indicating that the prohibition lacks
bite. 110 In particular, when structuring private equity transactions,
private equity bidders and target companies are able to exploit the fact
that private companies are outside the reach of the ban. Thus, the main
technique developed to evade financial assistance rules in the U.K.111
and Germany112 is to convert a public company into a private one before
granting security over the target’s assets. Nonetheless, certain national
legislatures have extended the ban to cover private companies as well.
Both Spain and Italy prohibit the granting of financial assistance by both
public and private companies.113 As a result, private equity bidders in
these countries rely on exemptions from merger restrictions in order to
complete buyouts. 114 In Spain, scholars’ and practitioners’ opinions
have spurred the development of an exemption for buyouts structured as
mergers, 115 while Italian legislators have introduced Article 2501 bis
Cod. civ., which explicitly allows merger LBOs subject to the
fulfillment of certain conditions.116 France, another important European
private equity market, has adopted an absolute ban on financial
110. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are
They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 39 (2006).
111. Pursuant to section 678 of the Companies Act of 2006, the law on financial
assistance is applicable solely to public companies. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §
678 (U.K.).
112. The German Stock Corporation Act prohibits any form of financial assistance
by the company to a third party for the purpose of acquiring shares in the company. See
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 71(a)
(Ger.), available at http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf. A similar ban does not exist in case of
German private limited companies (GmbH).
113. See Eilís Ferran, Regulation of Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout
Activity in Europe 23 n.110 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 84,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989748.
114. See id. at 23.
115. See id.
116. See Marco Silvestri, The New Italian Law on Merger Leveraged Buy-Outs: A
Law and Economics Perspective, 6 EUR. BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 101, 111–12
(2005).
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assistance by both public and private companies. 117 There, private
equity investors rely on post-acquisition dividends paid by the target in
order to service the debt incurred to complete the buyout.118
A similar ban on financial assistance does not exist in the U.S,
where creditors are protected against opportunistic buyouts by federal
and state fraudulent conveyance laws. 119 Following a wave of
bankruptcies of companies that had been taken private during the 1980s,
trustees representing the interests of creditors used fraudulent
conveyance laws to invalidate these buyouts.120 The U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), and its
successor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), protect
creditors against actual and constructive fraud on both federal and state
levels.121 Due to the difficulty of proving intent to defraud, which is a
necessary element of actual fraud, LBOs are usually attacked on the
basis of constructive fraud.122
For a court to determine that there has been constructive fraud,
either the trustee in bankruptcy or the creditors must satisfy a twopronged test. If the Bankruptcy Code or UFTA 123 applies, the first
prong requires the plaintiff to show that the transfer was not made for a
reasonably equivalent value. 124 If the UFCA is invoked, the plaintiff
must show that the transfer was not made for fair consideration. 125 In
the context of a leveraged buyout, it can be argued that the target never
received fair consideration or reasonably equivalent value, since the
target provides security for the benefit of the lender, while the proceeds
of the loan will pass to the target’s selling shareholders. As a result, the
target will have extended security over its assets without receiving
anything in return. The second prong requires the target company to be

117.
118.
119.

See Ferran, supra note 113, at 24.
See id.
Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1495–96 (1987).
120. See Silvestri, supra note 116, at 118.
121. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act has been adopted by most U.S. states. States that have not adopted a uniform act
address fraudulent conveyance either in non-uniform statutes or common law.
122. Liss, supra note 119, at 1495–96.
123. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(2), 5(a) (1984) [hereinafter
“U.F.T.A.”].
124. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
125. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3 (1918) [“hereinafter U.F.C.A.”].
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one of the following: insolvent at the time of the transaction, rendered
insolvent by the transaction,126 left with unreasonably small capital,127 or
the debtor intended to incur, or believed he would incur, debts beyond
his or her ability to pay (if the UFCA applies, the standard is ‘reasonably
should have believed’).128 Once a court determines that there has been a
fraudulent conveyance, the consequences can be severe. For instance,
the court can order the avoidance or subordination of the lender’s
claims, the recovery from the lender of any loan repayments, and the
recovery from the target’s old shareholders of any proceeds received
from the sale of their stock to the private equity bidder.129
When comparing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to LBOs, it
becomes clear that there is a remarkable divergence.130 The E.U. adopts
an ex ante general ban on LBOs, considering LBO transactions to be a
form of financial assistance, while the U.S. prefers an ex post standard.
In addition, legal intervention in the U.S. is exceptional in the sense that
LBOs may be attacked on grounds of fraudulent conveyance only in
cases of bankruptcy or insolvency. Thus, parties structuring LBO
transactions in Europe are faced with additional transaction costs
generated by the E.U.-wide ban on financial assistance and the relevant
rules promulgated by national legislatures. Costly legal advice is
necessary to ensure compliance with both national rules and local
market practices. In addition, the outright ban on financial assistance
impedes the functioning of the market for corporate control131 and has an
important signaling effect. It signals European legislators’ hostility
towards LBOs, which still have not gained the widespread acceptance
that they enjoy in the U.S.132
126.
127.

11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I); U.F.T.A. § 5(a); U.F.C.A. § 4.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II); U.F.C.A. § 5. The applicable test under the
U.F.T.A. is whether “the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction.” U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(i).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(B)(ii)(III); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii); UFCA § 6.
129. Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Theory of Fraudulent Conveyance
Cases involving Leveraged Buyouts, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 552 (1993), 581-586.
130. See Silvestri, supra note 116, at 120.
131. Enriques & Macey, supra note 105, at 1197–98.
132. For instance, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark,
openly criticized LBOs for saddling companies with debt and compromising workers’
rights. See generally Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Taming the Private Equity ‘Locusts’, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/10/
tamingtheprivateequitylo.
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B. STRUCTURING PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS IN THE U.S. AND
EUROPE
1. Structuring Public-to-Private Transactions in the U.S.
A public-to-private transaction in the U.S. can be structured as
either a one-step merger or a tender offer 133 followed by a back-end
merger.134 In a one-step merger, also known as a long-form merger,
section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)
dictates that the board of directors of each corporation must approve the
merger and submit the merger agreement to a stockholder vote.135 Prior
to the shareholder meeting, a merger proxy must be submitted for
review to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and once
cleared, it is mailed to the shareholders. 136 Thus, the process to
complete a one-step merger is particularly long and typically requires a
period of between two and three months.
A tender offer followed by a short-form merger is the quickest way
for a private equity buyer to complete an acquisition. Pursuant to Rule
14e-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, a tender offer must
be open for at least 20 business days.137 If the bidder acquires more than
90% of the target’s shares, it can effectuate a short-form merger138 and
close the transaction in as few as 20 days. However, if the acquirer fails
133. A tender offer is a public and open offer to all the shareholders of a public
company to tender their shares for sale. Tender offers are regulated by the Williams
Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l–
78n (2006)), which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
134. For the purpose of this article, we are assuming that both the bidder and the
target are incorporated in Delaware, the preferred state of incorporation for the majority
of U.S. public companies. Delaware’s competitive advantages are a developed body of
statutory law (The Delaware General Corporation Law), network and learning
externalities flowing from wide use of Delaware corporate law, a highly specialized
court system and Delaware’s commitment to shaping its law according to the needs of
its corporations. See generally Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998).
135. At least 51% of shareholders of both the acquirer and target must approve the
transaction. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2010).
136. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-6 (2012).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1.
138. According to section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a shortform merger requires only a resolution of the board of directors of the acquirer. A vote
of the target shareholders or a resolution of the board of directors of the target company
is not required. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (2010).
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to reach the 90% threshold, the bidder will have to complete a back-end
merger under section 251 of the DGCL and such timing benefits will be
lost. The latest innovation seeking to remedy this shortcoming is the
top-up option, which is increasingly used.139 A top-up option gives the
acquirer the right to purchase newly issued shares of the target upon
receiving a certain minimum of the target’s shares (usually 51%) in a
tender offer. This allows the acquirer to obtain a 90% ownership stake,
at which point it can complete a short-form merger.
A major drawback of tender offers is the implication of the margin
rules, which are regulations promulgated by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Regulations U and X140 limit the ability of
banks to extend financing for the purpose of acquiring margin stock
secured directly or indirectly by the margin stock.141 The margin rules
limit the amount banks can loan to 50% of the value of the collateral,
namely the value of margin stock. Nonetheless, these rules are not
involved in either a one-step merger or a tender offer followed by a
short-form merger. In a one-step merger, the debt extended to finance
the acquisition is secured by the target’s assets and not by margin stock.
Furthermore, in a tender offer followed by a short-form merger, if the
bidder acquires above 90% of the target’s stock and therefore is able to
complete a short-form merger, the merger will happen at the same time
as the conclusion of the tender offer. Therefore, the loans will be
considered secured by the target’s assets. On the contrary, if the bidder
does not succeed in obtaining 90% of the target’s stock and therefore
cannot complete a short-form merger, the bidder will be required to
perform a long-form back-end merger months after the front-end tender
offer. During that period, the only assets available to secure the loans
will be the shares acquired in the tender offer, namely margin stock. As
a result, the financing will be limited to 50% of the value of that margin
stock. The margin rules have historically been a major impediment to
structuring private equity transactions as tender offers.

139. Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Growing Number of Tender Offers,
DEALBOOK (Oct. 14, 2010, 3:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/behindthe-growing-number-of tender-offers.
140. 12 C.F.R. §§ 221, 224 (2012).
141. Margin stock includes any security that is publicly-traded.
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2. Structuring Public-to-Private Transactions in Europe
The structure of public-to-private deals in Europe depends upon the
mechanisms offered by the legal regimes of individual European
countries. The mergers and acquisitions landscape in Europe remains
particularly fragmented, with considerable divergence between each
nation’s rules. Differing national rules necessitate extensive and costly
legal advice by local lawyers. Such transaction costs for private equity
bidders inhibit the creation of a Pan-European buyout market.
a. Merger Structures in Europe
It is common for all European countries to offer a framework for
carrying out a merger. Nonetheless, European countries impose certain
onerous requirements, making this structure particularly unattractive for
parties involved in a public-to-private transaction. This is in contrast to
Delaware, which offers a relatively straightforward and simple
procedure for effecting mergers tailored to the needs of private equity
bidders. Our discussion relating to the relevant rules will be limited to
the U.K., Germany, and France, which account for the majority of
private equity activity in Europe.
In the U.K., private equity bidders utilize a form of corporate
reconstruction known as a “scheme of arrangement.” 142 Schemes of
arrangements in private equity transactions are structured as
“cancellation schemes” in which the target cancels all of its issued
shares and new shares are issued to the private equity bidder.143 Target
shareholders then receive cash in exchange for their cancelled shares.
Such a scheme requires the approval of 75% of target shareholders in
value with a majority of the shareholders present and voting at the

142. A “scheme of arrangement” resembles a merger structure in the sense that it
allows a bidder to obtain full control of the target company. See Scheme of
Arrangement, Practical Law Company (2013), http://uk.practicallaw.com/0-107-7201.
The provisions for completing a scheme of arrangement are found in Part 26 of the
Companies Act of 2006. The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, is the main statute that
regulates U.K. public and private companies.
143. A “cancellation scheme” involves a reduction of capital and therefore requires
the target to comply with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2006.
According to the Companies Act 2006, a reduction of capital requires a shareholder
resolution and a court order. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 645–649.
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meeting, 144 and must additionally be sanctioned by the court. 145
Schemes of arrangement are beneficial due to their binding effect on
shareholders who voted against the scheme or abstained from voting,
allowing the private equity investor to obtain full control of the target.
However, the high shareholder approval threshold and the requirement
for sanction by a court create considerable uncertainty to the
consummation of the transaction.
German law also provides for a statutory merger procedure
(Verschmelzung). In a German statutory merger,146 the shareholders of
the target company merging into the private equity acquirer receive
shares from the bidder in exchange for their own shares. A courtappointed auditor must examine the adequacy of the exchange ratio.147
The shareholders of both the acquirer and target company, representing
at least 75% of the share capital present, must approve the merger.148
The statutory merger takes effect upon the filing of the merger
resolutions with the companies’ registrars. 149 Shareholders may
challenge the merger resolution and thereby block the entry of the
resolution in the register.150 In addition, creditors may demand security
from the surviving company for any debts that are insufficiently
backed. 151 Statutory mergers are rarely used in private equity
transactions, mainly because the private equity bidder will not want
target shareholders to be part of the post-acquisition company.
Furthermore, the aforementioned shareholder and creditor rights
144. Id. § 899(1). The shareholders’ meeting requires a court order in order to be
convened. See id. § 896.
145. Id. § 899(2). The court will sanction the scheme after determining that the
statutory scheme has been adhered to, the meeting has been held properly and the
proposal for the scheme submitted to the shareholders is such that an intelligent and
honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might
reasonably approve. See Re Nat’l Bank Ltd., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 819 (Eng.).
146. The statutory merger is regulated by the German Transformation (or
Reorganization) Act (Umwaldungsgesetz or UmwG). See Umwaldungsgesetz [UmwG]
[Transformation Act], Oct. 28, 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I (Ger.).
147. Id. at 3210, §§ 9–12, 60.
148. Id. § 65(1).
149. Id § 16(1). The commercial register is the German public authority responsible
for approving the incorporation and keeping a registry of all companies incorporated in
its territory.
150. Id. § 14.
151. Id. § 22.
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introduce an element of legal uncertainty, which is unacceptable for
private equity bidders eager to quickly complete acquisitions of
promising companies.
A unique feature of the German legal system is the domination and
profit or loss transfer agreement.152 Under this agreement, one company
(the dominated company) submits itself to the direction of another
company (the dominating company). The dominating company may
give legally binding instructions to the dominated company. 153 The
dominated company’s profits are transferred to the dominating
company, but the dominating company must compensate the dominated
company for any annual losses. 154 A domination and profit or loss
transfer agreement must be approved by 75% of the dominated
company’s shareholders. 155 If the dominating company is a public
company, an approval by a similar majority is required.156
In the German private equity market, a bidder will first launch a
public takeover offer for all of the target company’s shares. After the
bidder succeeds in acquiring 75% of the target’s shares, they can vote in
favor of the domination and profit and loss agreement. However, to
protect the dominated company’s minority shareholders from
exploitation, German law requires the dominating company to offer to
acquire its own shares at fair market value as well as guarantee a
minimum dividend to minority shareholders who elect to stay in the
dominated company and not tender their shares.157
In France, the legal system offers a statutory merger procedure
known as a fusion.158 A French statutory merger involves an exchange
of shares whereby target shareholders exchange their own shares for

152. A domination and profit or loss transfer agreement resembles a merger
procedure insofar as it allows the bidder to obtain complete control of the target. It is
widely used in private quity transactions. For example, Blackstone Group employed a
domination and profit or loss transfer agreement in its buyout of Celanese.
153. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089,
§ 291(1) (Ger.), available at http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stockcorporation-act-2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 293(1).
156. Id. § 293(2).
157. Id. §§ 304, 305.
158. Statutory mergers (fusions) between public companies incorporated in France
(denoted by the label “S.A.”) are regulated by arts. L.236-8 to 236-22 of the French
Commercial Code, Code de Commerce.
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shares in the bidder. 159 As mentioned above, this requirement is
particularly unattractive for private equity acquirers. Furthermore, both
the bidder’s and target’s shareholders must approve the merger by a
majority vote of 75%. 160 Additionally, French law requires the
appointment of one or several merger auditors (commissaires à la
fusion), designated by the Chief Judge of the Commercial Court, who
ensure that the valuation of the relevant companies’ shares is appropriate
and the exchange ratio is fair.161 Creditors of both companies can also
oppose the merger plan in a court proceeding. The Commercial Court
may approve or reject the opposition. However, even in the case that
the opposition is rejected and the merger is allowed to proceed, the court
can order the repayment of the debt or the constitution of guarantees, if
offered by the absorbing company. The strictness of the French law
governing statutory mergers can be seen as a manifestation of the heavyhanded social control over business that characterizes the French legal
system.162
b. Takeover Offers in Europe
The takeover offer is an alternative mechanism that is widely used
by private equity bidders in order to complete public-to-private deals in
Europe. In a private equity transaction, the bidder will typically launch
a voluntary takeover offer for all the shares of the target company.
Since a bidder rarely succeeds in obtaining 100% of the target’s share
capital, it will attempt a statutory procedure called a “squeeze-out”.163
In a squeeze out, the bidders seek to acquire enough shares to meet the
threshold required by national rules, at which point the bidder can force
the minority shareholders to sell their shares.

159.
160.

These are known as statutory mergers by absorption (fusion-absorption).
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.236-9 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations.
161. C. COM. art. L.236-10.
162. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 285, 307 (2008).
163. The term “squeeze-out” refers to a statutory procedure whereby a bidder who
has acquired a certain percentage of shares (the relevant percentage varies between
Member States) is able to require the remaining minority shareholders to sell their
shares in return for consideration.
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A major impediment to private equity bidders structuring deals as
takeover offers is the divergence of national takeover regimes within the
European Union. In an effort to create a harmonized takeover regime,
lower the costs of takeovers, and promote takeover activity in the
European Union, the E.U. adopted Directive 2004/25/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of April 21, 2004, on takeover
bids (“Takeover Directive”). 164 The legislative process lasted fifteen
years and was marked by heated negotiations and intense lobbying of
individual European countries.165 This was especially true for Germany,
which viewed the liberal takeover regime promoted by the Takeover
Directive as a threat to its closed and consensual corporate system,
commonly referred to as Deutschland AG.166 The resulting Directive
establishes a common framework for takeover bids in the E.U. and sets
minimum requirements that must be followed by individual Member
States. The relevant rules apply to takeover offers167 for shares of listed
companies.168
The Takeover Directive requires bidders to announce their decision
to make a bid without delay and to prepare an offer document containing
enhanced disclosures that will be made publicly available. This
promotes market transparency and enables target shareholders to make

164. Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12.
165. Nigel Waddington, The Europeanisation of Corporate Governance in Germany
and the U.K. 14 (June 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/6119/.
166. Id.
167. According to article 2(1)(a) of the Takeover Directive, a takeover bid is defined
as “a public offer . . . made to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all
or some of those securities, whether mandatory or voluntary, which follows or has as its
objective the acquisition of control of the offeree company in accordance with national
law.” Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 2(1)(a), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 15
(EC).
168. Since the Directive establishes only minimum requirements, Member States are
allowed to introduce more stringent provisions. Id., art. 3(2), at 16. Additionally,
Member States are able to extend the application of their national takeover legislation to
non-listed companies. A prominent example is the U.K. Takeover Code, which applies
to takeovers for both listed and non-listed public companies. Subject to certain
conditions being fulfilled, the Takeover Code also applies to private companies. See
TAKEOVER CODE, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/downloadcode.
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informed decisions. 169 The target board should also prepare a public
document setting forth its opinion on the bid. 170 All of the target
company’s shareholders must be treated equally 171 and offered the
highest offer price.172 Furthermore, in order to allow target shareholders
to properly evaluate the takeover offer, Member States are required to
provide a sufficient time period for the acceptance of the bid, ranging
from two to ten weeks.173 By setting a floor on the acceptance period,
the Takeover Directive protects target shareholders from so-called
“Saturday Night Specials.”174
The most innovative and controversial rules of the Takeover
Directive are the mandatory bid rule, the board neutrality rule, the
break-through rule, and squeeze-out and sell-out rights. The mandatory
bid rule obligates a bidder who acquires a specified percentage of voting
rights in a target company, and is granted control over that company, to
make an offer to purchase the entire company at an equitable price.175
Thus, bidders are prevented from launching highly coercive partial bids
and front-end loaded bids. 176 In addition, the rule protects minority
shareholders by ensuring that they will share any control premium along
with any controlling shareholder that sells his stake. Member States are
169.
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, arts. 6(2), 8, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12,
18–19 (EC).
170. Id., art. 9(5), at 19.
171. Id., art. 3(1)(a), at 15.
172. Id., art. 5(4), at 17.
173. Id., art. 7, at 18.
174. A “Saturday Night Special” is a coercive takeover offer open for a very short
period of time, usually a few days. Target shareholders are pressured to quickly accept
or decline the offer without having sufficient time to properly evaluate it. This
technique was widely used in the U.S. in the early 1970s.
175.
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 5(1), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17
(EC).
176. In a partial bid, target shareholders will be pressured to tender their shares out
of fear that they will be left with low value minority shares in a company controlled by
a new shareholder. A “front-end loaded” bid creates the same pressure for shareholders
to tender their shares. In a “front-end loaded” bid, the bidder will launch an initial
partial bid at a high premium in order to gain effective control of the target company
and will simultaneously indicate its intention to launch a “back-end” offer for the
remaining shares at a reduced price. Therefore, shareholders are pressured to tender
their shares at the initial bid even if they view the rejection of the bid as the valuemaximizing choice. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An
Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987).
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responsible for determining the requisite percentage of voting rights that
triggers a mandatory bid. Another area where discretion is afforded to
Member States is the ability to waive the application of the mandatory
bid rule in individual cases.177
In contrast with the U.S. approach that provides management with
broad latitude to defend against takeovers, the Takeover Directive,
incorporating the principle of shareholder choice, prohibits target
management from erecting pre- or post-bid takeover defenses. 178 The
board neutrality rule prevents the board of the target company from
taking any action to frustrate a takeover bid without prior shareholder
approval.179 Article 11 of the Takeover Directive introduces the breakthrough rule that neutralizes vis-à-vis a bidder certain takeover defenses
installed prior to the launch of a takeover offer, such as restrictions on
the transfer of shares, voting caps, and multiple voting shares.
Nevertheless, the impact of both of these rules is weakened by Article
12 of the Takeover Directive, which makes the implementation of
Articles 9 and 11 optional by giving Member States the power to opt out
of these rules. 180
In order to protect a majority shareholder from the opportunistic
behavior of minority shareholders, Article 16 of the Takeover Directive
allows a majority shareholder who has acquired between 90% and 95%
of the capital carrying voting shares to obligate minority shareholders to
sell their shares at the price offered in the preceding takeover offer.181
The squeeze-out right makes takeover offers more attractive by enabling
a successful bidder to fully integrate the target into its operations. This
procedure is widely used by private equity bidders, who seek to obtain
full control of the target company. On the other hand, the sell-out right
introduced by Article 15 of the Takeover Directive protects a minority
shareholder from being exploited by a controlling shareholder by
providing him a put option to sell his shares to the controlling
shareholders. 182 The relevant thresholds and price to be offered mirror
the ones applicable in the case of a squeeze-out.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Directive 2004/25, art. 4(5), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17 (EC).
Id., art. 9, at 19.
Id.
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 21

(EC).
181. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 22
(EC). The relevant threshold is to be determined by individual Member States.
182. Id. art. 15, at 22.
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Overall, even after the adoption and implementation of the
Takeover Directive, a truly harmonized Pan-European takeover regime
is still far from becoming a reality. European legislators prefer
minimum harmonization, thus allowing Member States to impose more
stringent and extensive provisions than the ones found in the Takeover
Directive. Nevertheless, the harmonization of the rules governing the
organization of takeover offers, such as the requirement for enhanced
disclosures to target shareholders and the minimum acceptance period,
is a particularly welcome development in line with the European
Union’s goal of promoting takeover activity. On the other hand, the
optionality arrangement allowing Member States to avoid the
application of the board neutrality and break-through rules does little to
facilitate and promote cross-border takeover activity. In fact, the
European Commission has acknowledged the reluctance of Member
States to lift takeover barriers.183
As a result of the minimum harmonization strategy adopted by
European legislators, the Member States’ takeover regimes show
considerable variability, in line with the differing stages of development
of each country’s takeover market. For instance, the Takeover Code’s
specialized provisions for management buyouts 184 reflect the
sophistication of the U.K.’s takeover market, which has traditionally
been the most developed in Europe. Furthermore, the framework nature
of the Takeover Directive—where the EU sets minimum standards—
allows individual Member States to introduce more stringent
requirements when implementing the relevant rules. For example,
Article 9(5) of the Takeover Directive requires a target company’s board
of directors to publish its opinion of the bid, the impact it will have on
the company’s interests (specifically employees), and the bidder’s

183. Only three out of twenty-five Member States have introduced the breakthrough rule into their national legislation. See generally Commission Report on the
Implementation of The Directive on Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268 final (Feb. 21,
2007).
184. See, e.g., TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 3.1, at D20 (stressing the importance of
independent advice to the board of the offeree company in case of a management
buyout); Rule 20.3, at I12 (requiring the private equity bidder to disclose to the target
board all the information that is furnished to external providers of finance for the
transaction).
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strategic plans for the company.185 The vague and open-ended nature of
the provision is a perfect example of the EU’s minimum harmonization
strategy, which grants Member States wide discretion in implementing
the provision. Contrasting the ways in which Germany and the U.K.
have implemented the abovementioned article illustrates the EU’s
minimum harmonization strategy. Section 27 of the German Securities
Acquisition and Takeover Act, 186 which governs takeover offers for
listed companies, requires the target board’s statement to describe the
type and amount of consideration offered, the objectives of the bidder,
the consequences of a successful bid for the target company and its
employees, and the intention of the target board members with regards
to accepting the offer if they hold securities in the target. On the
contrary, Rule 25 of the Takeover Code contains more extensive
information requirements on the part of the target’s board including
details of any securities held by the target or its directors in the bidder,187
service contracts between any director of the target with the company,188
and the fees and expenses that the target will incur in relation to the
offer.189
Another example is the implementation of the squeeze-out
procedure in the laws of Member States. As mentioned above, the
Takeover Directive provides individual Member States with the
opportunity to set a threshold above which a majority shareholder may
exercise the right to squeeze-out minority shareholders, provided that it
is between 90% and 95% of the voting shares. While the relevant
threshold in France is set at 95% of the voting shares, in Spain, a
controlling shareholder who has acquired only 90% may effectuate a
squeeze-out. 190 In addition, certain Member States, such as Germany,
have introduced more stringent requirements for completing a squeezeout of minority shareholders by requiring court approval.191
185. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 9(5), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 18–
19 (EC).
186. Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz [WpÜG] [Securities Acquisition
and Takeover Act], Dec. 20, 2001, BGBL. I at 3822, § 27 (Ger.).
187. TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 25.4, at J19.
188. Id., Rule 25.5, at J21.
189.
Id., Rule 25.8, at J23.
190. BONELLI EREDE PAPPALARDO ET AL., GUIDE TO PUBLIC TAKEOVERS IN EUROPE
(2013) at 325, 335, available at http://www.debrauw.com/News/Publications/Pages/
GuidetoPublicTakeoversinEurope.aspx.
191. Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act § 39a (Ger.).
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Thus, despite the adoption of the Takeover Directive, a PanEuropean takeover market is still far from a reality. Private equity
bidders structuring buyouts are left to deal with a variety of supervisory
authorities and local rules. Local lawyers need legal advice from
specialists, thereby raising transactions. One should contrast European
takeover regulations with the U.S. model, where the Williams Act
regulates tender offers on a federal level without the involvement of
U.S. states. Although the conduct of the board of directors in the U.S.
takeover context is regulated on a state level, the laws of Delaware are
widespread as it is the preferred state of incorporation for U.S. public
companies. As a result, the U.S. has effectively adopted a unified and
coherent takeover regime, providing certainty to parties structuring
buyouts.
III. AFTER THE CRISIS: THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND
MANAGERS DIRECTIVE AND THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Politicians and the public on both sides of the Atlantic regularly
criticize the private equity industry—commonly viewed as the dark side
of capitalism—for slashing jobs, breaking up companies, and pressuring
them to focus on short-term results instead of long-term growth.192 The
Financial Crisis was the perfect opportunity for politicians to fulfill their
desire to regulate the private equity industry. The AIFM Directive and
the Dodd-Frank Act, both adopted in the aftermath of the crisis, contain
provisions directly aimed at private equity. While the AIFM Directive
solely targets the alternative investment fund industry, the ambit of the
Dodd-Frank Act is much broader. As Skeel notes, the Dodd-Frank
Act’s objectives are twofold: “[i]ts first objective is to limit the risk of
contemporary finance . . . ; and the second is to limit the damage caused
by the failure of a large financial institution.”193 The provisions relating
to the regulation of private equity funds can be seen as fulfilling the first
objective.

192.
193.

Rasmussen, supra note 132.
DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 4 (2010).
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A. AIFM DIRECTIVE
The AIFM Directive, adopted in November 2010, was one of the
most controversial and hotly debated pieces of legislation in European
legislative history. Calls to regulate the alternative investment fund
industry were common even before the Financial Crisis. Within Europe,
the European Parliament was one of the most prominent institutions to
criticize the industry. The Parliament adopted various resolutions
calling upon the Commission to examine the industry’s potential
negative effects. 194 Furthermore, the Parliamentary Socialist Group,
traditionally hostile to Anglo-Saxon capitalism, published a report in
March, 2007 highlighting the detrimental effects of private equity and
hedge funds and the need for tight regulation.195 The overall sentiment
in favor of regulation was supported by public criticism of hedge funds
and private equity tactics by politicians of individual Member States.196
The Financial Crisis, regarded as a crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism,
was the ideal opportunity for Germany and France, the main proponents
of stricter regulation, to put forward their own agenda. They did so
despite resistance from the U.K., which viewed the AIFM Directive as a
threat to London’s prominence as a center for hedge funds and buy-out
firms operating in Europe.197 The final version of the AIFM Directive
was adopted after eighteen months of intense lobbying and heated
negotiations.198
The main goal of the AIFM Directive is to create a harmonized
regulatory and supervisory framework for alternative investment fund
194. See generally European Parliament Resolution on the Future of Hedge Funds
and Derivatives, P5_TA(2004)0031; European Parliament Resolution on Asset
Management, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0181.
195. IEKE VAN DEN BURG & POUL NYRUP RASMUSSEN, PSE, SOCIALIST GROUP OF
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (2007).
196. For instance, Guilio Tremonti, the Italian Finance Minister described hedge
funds as “hellish” and demanded their abolishment. See Tracy Corrigan, Hedge Funds
Don’t Need Punishing – They are Suffering Enough, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Oct. 16,
2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/tracycorrigan/3212102/Hedgefunds-dont-need-punishing-they-are-suffering-enough.html.
197. Elena Moya, City Lobbying Helps Water Down European Hedge Fund
Legislation Plans, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 27, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2009/jul/27/hedge-funds-european-directive.
198. Eilís Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private
Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 379, 398 (2011).
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managers (“AIFMs”) and promote an internal market for their activities.
The need for regulation was premised on the perceived lack of
transparency in the industry and the systemic risk that this posed to the
financial system.199 The scope of the AIFM Directive is broad; it covers
alternative investment fund managers established in the E.U. that
manage alternative investment funds (“AIFs”), whether EU-based or
not, and non-E.U. based AIFMs that manage and/or market one or more
AIFs in the EU. 200 An AIFM is defined as “[any] legal person[] whose
regular business is managing one or more AIFs.” 201 As a result, the
AIFM Directive covers a broad array of AIFMs that includes managers
of private equity funds, hedge funds, commodity funds, and real estate
funds.
AIFMs covered by the AIFM Directive must receive authorization
from the competent authorities of their home Member States.202 The
Directive grants an exemption to AIFMs managing AIFs whose assets
under management do not exceed €100 million. 203 It also exempts
AIFMs managing unleveraged AIFs that grant investors no redemption
rights for a period of five years and whose assets do not exceed €500
million.204 These thresholds have been heavily criticized as being too
low, thus extending the application of the Directive to AIFMs that pose

199. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and
2009/65/EC, at 2–3 (COM) (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009).
200. Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC
and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010,
Preamble, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 3 [hereinafter AIFM Directive].
201. Id., art. 4(1)(b). Pursuant to Article 4(1)(a), an AIF is defined as any collective
investment undertaking that “raise[s] capital from a number of investors with a view to
investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those
investors” and which “do[es] not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of
Directive 2009/65/EC” (commonly known as “UCITS” Directive).
202. Id., art. 7.
203. Id., art. 3(2). The second exemption has in essence been created for private
equity firms. One should note that the AIFMs exempted are still required to register
with the competent authorities of their home Member State and provide information on
the main instruments on which they are trading and their investment strategies. See id.,
art. 3(3).
204. Id.
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no systemic threat to the financial system.205 Additionally, the AIFM
Directive imposes minimum capital requirements on AIFMs 206 and
requires them to devise and maintain appropriate liquidity 207 and risk
management systems,208 remuneration policies that discourage excessive
risk-taking,209 and systems for identifying and managing any conflicts of
interests.210 AIFMs must also ensure that a depository is appointed for
each AIF under management211 and that each of AIF’s assets are valued
at least once per year.212
In addition, the AIFM Directive imposes wide-ranging
transparency and disclosure obligations. AIFMs must make available to
their supervisory authority and, on request, to investors, an audited
annual report with respect to each E.U. fund managed by and marketed
in the EU.213 Additionally, Article 24 of the AIFM Directive requires
fund managers to regularly report to their supervisory authorities on
matters such as the principal markets in which they trade, the main
exposures of each fund they manage, and the main asset classes in
which a fund is invests. 214 AIFMs must also ensure that certain
information is made available to investors prior to their investment in a
fund and periodically thereafter.215
The AIFM Directive includes provisions aimed directly at LBOs of
E.U.-listed and non-listed companies. AIFMs managing AIFs that
acquire voting rights reaching, exceeding or falling below certain
thresholds (starting at 10%) must notify their appropriate authorities.216
In addition, once an AIF acquires control of a non-listed company, the
205. According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association,
private equity firms below €1 billion that provide financing to small and medium-sized
firms and operate on a regional, local or national level pose no threat to financial
stability. See EUR. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL INDUS., RESPONSE TO THE
PROPOSED DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL ON ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS (AIFM) 3 (2009).
206. AIFM Directive, art. 9, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 22.
207. Id., art. 16.
208. Id., art. 15.
209. Id., art. 13.
210. Id., art. 14.
211. Id., art. 21.
212. Id., art. 19.
213. Id., art. 22.
214. Id., art. 24.
215. Id., art. 23.
216. Id., art. 27(1).
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fund manager must notify its supervisory authority, the non-listed
company, and its shareholders of the acquisition.217 Article 28 imposes
additional disclosure requirements once control of a listed or non-listed
company is acquired. In particular, the AIFM managing the AIF that
obtains control over the company shall make its identity, as well as its
policy for managing any resulting conflicts of interest, available to the
supervisory authority and the company.218 The annual report of a nonlisted company controlled by an AIF, as well as the report of the AIF
itself, must also contain a fair review of the company’s past and future
business development.219 Additionally, the AIF must make available to
the relevant authorities information regarding the financing of an
acquisition of a non-listed company. 220 Article 30 is a particularly
interventionist provision. This provision prevents an AIFM, managing
an AIF that acquires control of a listed or non-listed company, from
facilitating, supporting, instructing, or voting in favor of any
distribution, capital reduction, share redemption, or share buyback for a
period of two years following the acquisition of control.221
A positive aspect of the AIFM Directive is the creation of an
internal market for alternative investment funds. E.U.-based AIFMs are
allowed to market E.U. AIFs with a passport across the Union. 222
However, non-E.U. based AIFMs marketing AIFs (E.U. based or not)
and E.U. based AIFs marketing non-E.U. AIFs must market funds
according to national private placement regimes until the European
Commission allows the extension of the passporting provisions which is
expected to take effect in 2015.223
Overall, the AIFM Directive has been criticized as being an “odd,
political piece of law making.” 224 The main target of European
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id., art. 27(2)–(3).
Id., art. 28(1)–(2).
Id., art. 29.
Id., art. 28(5).
Id., art. 30. This restriction is subject to the qualification that payments out of
distributable profits are allowed but only when such payments do not cause the
company’s net assets to fall below the level of subscribed capital plus non-distributable
reserves.
222. Id., art. 32.
223. Id., arts. 35–42 & 67(6).
224. Walter R. Henle & Allan Murry-Jones, Alternative Investment Fund Managers
Directive (Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate & Flom LLP), Nov. 29, 2010.
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legislators was the hedge fund industry, with private equity being swept
along as well.225 The rationales underpinning the adoption of the AIFM
Directive—namely the need to tackle systemic risk and increase the
transparency of the industry—are unsound reasons for regulating private
equity. The private equity industry is unlikely to be a source of systemic
risk, 226 and therefore obligating disclosures to supervisory authorities
makes little sense. 227 An important concern is the effect that a
widespread failure of private equity-backed companies would have on
the banking system, which finances LBO deals. Nevertheless, even the
European Central Bank has acknowledged that LBO activity poses little
systemic risk to the banking sector. 228 Furthermore, assuming that a
danger does exist, the best course of action would be to directly regulate
the banking sector, which was the main contributor to the LBO boom
through its extension of cheap financing to private equity buyers.229 In
addition to necessitating enhanced disclosures to supervisors, the AIFM
Directive also requires that substantial disclosures be made to investors.
However, investors in private equity funds are sophisticated and capable
of demanding this information in an arm’s length bargain.230
The valuation and depository requirements also add undue costs on
the private equity industry. Valuation requirements make little sense in
the private equity context. Distributions to investors are made upon
liquidation of the investments via an initial public offering (“IPO”),
secondary sale, or trade sale, which provides an objective third party
valuation.231 The use of depositories is intended to prevent Madoff-style
frauds. However, as Dan Awrey notes, “[t]he long term, illiquid and
typically very public nature of the investments made by these
225.
226.

Payne, supra note 17, at 582.
Indeed, private equity neither contributed to nor caused the recent financial
crisis and there was no widespread failure of private equity-backed companies.
227. Payne, supra note 17, at 584.
228. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, LARGE BANKS AND PRIVATE EQUITY-SPONSORED
LEVERAGE BUYOUTS IN THE EU (Apr. 2007).
229. Shasha Dai, The Inner Circle of Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J. PRIVATE EQUITY
BLOG, (Mar. 10, 2009, 5:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/03/10/theinner-circle-of-systemic-risk/.
230. Indeed, disclosures to funds’ investors have generally been found to be
adequate. See generally DAVID WALKER, DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE
EQUITY: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT JULY 2007 (2007).
231. Dan Awrey, The Limits of E.U. Hedge Fund Regulation, 20 (Oxford Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 8.2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757719.
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institutions virtually eliminates the potential for Madoff-type fraud.”232
Furthermore, the disclosure provisions aimed at LBOs have been
criticized for putting private equity investors at a competitive
disadvantage to other investors such as sovereign wealth funds,
foundations, and pension funds, which fall outside the ambit of the
AIFM Directive.
The AIFM Directive imposes significant and undue costs on the
private equity industry. It has been estimated that the sum of one-time
and ongoing costs amount to € 1 billion.233 For example, private equity
firms may decide to exit the European market, depriving European
investors of the opportunity to invest in private equity and lowering the
competitiveness of the European economy. On the flip side, the firms
which decide to continue operating in Europe and marketing their funds
to E.U. investors will face higher costs that will be passed on to
investors in the form of higher fees and lower returns.
B. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The Dodd-Frank Act is the first attempt in the U.S. to directly
regulate the private equity industry. Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act234
forces the traditionally secretive private equity industry to disclose
information about its operations to regulators and the investing public.
Thus, regulators are able to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the
financial system. In addition, the Volcker Rule, found in section 619 of
the Act, prohibits banking entities from sponsoring or retaining any
equity, partnership or other ownership interest in a private equity fund,
subject to certain exceptions. 235 The aim of the Volcker Rule is to
reduce excessive risk taking by the banking sector and to prohibit
banking entities from benefiting from government support for their
speculation at the expense of taxpayers and depositors.236
232.
233.

Id. at 19.
KYLA MALCOLM ET AL., CHARLES RIVERS ASSOCIATES, IMPACT OF THE
PROPOSED AIFM DIRECTIVE ACROSS EUROPE 112–13 (2009).
234. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, art. IV, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
235. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(a)(1)(B).
236. The Volcker Rule is also applicable to non-bank financial companies
supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve that engage in the above
mentioned activities. Instead of prohibiting these entities from sponsoring or investing
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Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act repeals section 203(b)(3) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), thereby requiring
fund managers to register as investment advisers. Section 203(b)(3)
previously allowed fund managers who did not hold themselves out as
investment advisors to the general public and had fewer than fifteen
clients over a twelve-month period to avoid registration with the SEC.
As a result, private equity fund managers controlling assets above
certain thresholds237 will be subject to enhanced disclosure requirements.
Fund managers must maintain certain reports and records for each
private equity fund they manage, as well as make them available to the
SEC for inspection. These reports and records include information
about the fund’s assets, trading practices, valuation policies and
practices, types of assets held, and trading and investment positions.238
The Act further requires the SEC to share reports and documents with
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a newly established body
tasked with monitoring systemic risk in the U.S. financial system.239
The so-called Volcker Rule, named after its creator and former
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, prohibits banking
entities240 from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other

in hedge funds or private equity funds, these entities will be subject to additional capital
requirements and quantitative limits. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(a)(2).
237. An adviser with assets under management of less than $100 million and subject
to state regulation will generally be prohibited from registering with the SEC and must
register with its state regulator. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 410, § (2). Furthermore, the
Dodd-Frank Act contains an exemption from registration for advisers solely to private
funds if they manage assets under $150 million. See id., sec. 408, § 203. A private fund
is defined as any issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. See
id., sec. 402, § 202(a)(29). Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
provides an exemption for an issuer whose securities are owned by not more than 100
persons, while section 3(c)(7) exempts any issuer who offers its securities to “qualified
purchasers.” Therefore, the definition of “private fund” includes private equity funds
that rely on sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) in order to avoid regulation as an investment
company.
238. Id., sec. 404, § (2)(b)(3).
239. Id., sec. 404, § (1)–(2)(b)(7).
240. The definition of a banking entity is wide, encompassing any insured
depository institution, any company that controls an insured bank, any company treated
as a bank holding company under the International Banking Act, and any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity.
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ownership interest in a private equity fund. 241 It also prohibits them
from sponsoring a private equity fund, which includes serving as a
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a fund; selecting or
controlling the funds’ directors, trustees, or management; or sharing the
same name as the fund.242 Despite this prohibition, banking entities are
still allowed to advise such funds. 243 The Volcker Rule creates an
exception, allowing a banking organization to organize and offer a
private equity fund and make a de minimis investment in such fund.244
The entity must provide bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment
advisory services to such fund and organize and offer the fund solely to
its customers who use such services. An investment is permitted
provided that it has not exceeded 3% of the outstanding ownership
interests in the fund one year after its establishment. The total
investments of a banking entity in such funds should be limited to 3% of
its Tier 1 capital. Nonetheless, regulators may prohibit such activities if
they pose a threat to the financial stability of the banking entity or the
U.S., involve material conflicts of interest, or would result in a material
exposure of the banking organization to high-risk assets or trading
strategies.245
Overall, the U.S. has decided to adopt a more lenient approach than
Europe when it comes to regulating private equity. The U.S. position is
rooted in the long history of private equity within the country, as well as
its role as a positive force in promoting business activity. In contrast to
the EU’s AIFM Directive, which imposes wide-ranging disclosure
requirements and mandates the use of depository and valuation
mechanisms, the Dodd-Frank Act contains registration and limited
disclosure requirements intended to monitor systemic risk. Even though
the private equity industry is unlikely to be a source of systemic risk,
these requirements do not burden it with insurmountable costs and will
241. A private equity fund is defined as any issuer that would be an investment
company pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or
3(c)(7) of that Act or any similar fund as the regulators may determine. See id., sec.
619, § 13(h)(2).
242. Id., sec. 619, § 13(h)(5).
243. The Dodd-Frank Act, COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS (Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP), July 2012, available at http://www.skadden.com/insights/
skadden-commentary-dodd-frank-act.
244. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(G).
245. Id., sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(I).
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therefore not significantly impact LBO activity. However, the Volcker
Rule may have a chilling effect on private equity activity since banks are
an important source of investment capital for private equity. 246 In
addition, private equity investments represent a negligible amount of
total bank assets and therefore pose little risk on banks’ balance
sheets. 247 However, one should note that the Volcker Rule seeks to
regulate a limited segment of the private equity industry, namely banks’
investments in and sponsorship of funds. Though banks are an
important source of capital for private equity firms, there exists a wide
array of other institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies,
and university endowments that also serve as investors in private equity.
For instance, public pension funds, which have long invested in private
equity, are increasing their allocations to the industry and starting to
make direct private equity style investments in companies. 248 As a
result, the rule’s negative impact on the development of the U.S. private
equity industry is overstated.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PAST AND PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY
Despite the hostile legal regime governing private equity
transactions, the European private equity market managed to grow and
mature from 1996 onwards, 249 reaching its greatest heights between
2003 and 2007. Indeed, between 2000 and 2004, Western Europe was
able to surpass the U.S. in transaction value.250 2001 was the first time
that European LBO activity exceeded that of the U.S. 251 Public-toprivate transactions featured prominently during the European LBO

246. Implications of the ‘Volcker Rules’ for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 13 (2010) (statement of Hal
Scott, Professor, International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School, and Director,
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation).
247. Id. at 14.
248. Michael Corkery, Public Pensions Increase Private Equity Investments, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020380650457718
1272061850732.html.
249. Wright et al., supra note 9, at 38.
250. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 128.
251. Jake Powers, The History of Private Equity & Venture Capital,
CorporateLiveWire (Feb. 20, 2012, 9:24 AM) http://www.corporatelivewire.com/topstory.html?id=the-history-of-private-equity-venture-capital.
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boom. 252 Economic forces fueled the growth of private equity and
overcame its unfavorable legal regime. The introduction of the common
currency, the euro, and the development of the European single market
facilitated cross-border acquisitions by eliminating currency risks and
investment barriers. Furthermore, the abundant liquidity in the financial
system made European banks eager to provide financing to private
equity sponsors. European banks were also increasingly willing to
provide larger loans for private equity transactions.253 The development
of a European high-yield debt market, virtually non-existent before
1997, provided an additional source of funding for private equity
dealmakers.254
Another important factor was the financialization 255 of Europe
during the 2000s. Europe saw its financial sector grow exponentially,
with European countries embracing the latest innovations of finance.
The banking sector experienced a boom while investment banking,
hedge funds, and private equity became household names. Throughout
the last decade, European policymakers promoted the liberalization of
the financial sector and the integration of European financial markets.256
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the advent of
globalization and economic liberalism, particularly during the last

252. Mike Wright et al., Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Retrospect and
Prospect, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE 353, 354 (2009).
253. The lending standards of European banks were so lax that, according to Dalip
Pathak, managing director of Warburg Pincus’ London office, private equity firms
dealing with banks in Europe “literally had to say to the banks that they did not want to
take all that money.” See Expect Europe’s Private Equity Market to Contract,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 12, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=2508.
254. Brian Hoffmann et al., Europe’s High-Yield Bond Market Evolves, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 13, 2001, at M6.
255. As Epstein notes, “financialization means the increasing role of financial
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of
the domestic and international economies. FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 3 (Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2006).
256. The integration of financial markets was one of the goals included in the
Lisbon Agenda, as it was considered a means of enhancing the efficient allocation of
capital, thereby promoting growth and employment. See Presidency Conclusions,
Lisbon European Council (Mar. 23, 2000).
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decade, led to the relative decline of social democracy257 in Europe and
the rise of laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon capitalism.258 Global competition
in the product and capital markets forced European companies to
restructure their operations, rationalize costs, and adopt the principle of
shareholder value. 259 Private equity investors cooperated with target
companies, offering their expertise in achieving these goals.
The adoption of the AIFM Directive has raised concerns about the
future of the European private equity market. There are growing fears
that the AIFM Directive could result in an exit of private equity firms
and funds from Europe, putting the continent at a competitive
disadvantage versus other markets, such as the U.S. Nonetheless, even
assuming that the AIFM Directive’s impact is negative, underlying
economic forces sparked by the sovereign debt crisis will provide a
boost to public-to-private activity in Europe. The current debt crisis,
which began in Greece, spread throughout the periphery of the Eurozone
and now threatens the survival of the euro. The crisis has obligated
Member States such as Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal to
enact broad reforms, including privatizations and labor deregulation.
These countries have moved forward with ambitious privatization plans

257. According to Gourevitch, “[s]ocial democracy gives voice to claims on the firm
in addition to those of the shareholders: employee job security, income distribution,
regional or national development, social welfare and social stability, and nationalism, to
name a few.” See Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance
Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1830 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE
IMPACT (2003)).
258. The Anglo-Saxon capitalist model is characterized by deregulated labor and
financial markets, a legal regime promoting competition in the product markets, limited
or non-existent workers’ participation rights in the governance of corporations, and a
recognition of shareholders as their ultimate owners.
259. Pursuant to the principle of shareholder value creation or shareholder primacy
that developed in the U.S., the corporation should be managed in the interests of
shareholders who exercise ultimate control over its affairs. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 440–441
(2001). Continental European countries, most notably Germany and France, have
adopted the stakeholder theory of the corporation. The corporation should be managed
in the interests of all stakeholders in the firm, including shareholders, employees,
customers and communities. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory and the Corporate Objective Function (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 0101, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220671.

666

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

seeking to enhance the competitiveness of their economies260 and repay
their massive debt burdens. 261 Additionally, inefficiently run stateowned companies managed according to the desires of special interest
groups are natural targets for private equity firms specializing in
rationalizing costs and restructuring poorly managed enterprises.262
Furthermore, the debt crisis has obligated southern European
countries to enact broad-ranging reforms aimed at deregulating their
rigid labor markets and relaxing their strict employment protection
Private equity investments often involve labor
regulation. 263

260. For an excellent overview of the beneficial effects of privatizations, see
William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321 (2001).
261. See Alkman Granitsas, Greece Speeds Up Plans to Sell Off State-Held Assets,
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2702304520804576341414080784514.html; Nektaria Stamouli, Greece Accepts
OPAP’s Bid for State Lotteries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20121212-706753.html; Eamon Quinn, Ireland
Identifies State Assets for Sale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577238793257737830.htm
l; Pablo Dominguez, Spain Hires RBS to Privatize Airports, WALL ST. J., June 20,
2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230393670457639
7394220462996.html; Stephen L. Bernard, Italy’s Frattini Sees Next Austerity Package
Soon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001
424053111904563904576585282025615242.html; Wayne Ma & Patricia Kowsmann,
China Gets Stake in Portugal’s EDP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577114471370252
452.html; Patricia Kowsmann, Portugal Shelves TAP Sale, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732446160457819152380
6172276.html.
262. For instance BC Partners and TPG have expressed interest in buying the Greek
government’s 33% stake in Greek gambling monopoly OPAP. See Stelios Bouras, BC
Partners, TPG, Among Seven Cleared to Take Part in OPAP Sale, PRIVATE EQUITY
NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012) http://www.penews.com/archive/keyword/opap/1/content/
4071471253. OPAP is an emblematic, partly state-owned company which has been
used by politicians as a vehicle for preferential allocation of lucrative contracts to
suppliers, most notably the Intracom group and its affiliate Intralot, and has also been
associated with exceptionally high labor costs. See Stavros Gadinis, Can Company
Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek
Privatizations, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 525, 528–530 (2012).
263. Fiona Ehlers et al., Bitter Medicine: Belated Reforms Cut Deep in Southern
Europe, DER SPIEGEL, Apr. 16, 2012 (Ger.), available at http://www.spiegel.de/
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restructurings in an effort to improve the performance of the company,
and a flexible labor regime is therefore crucial for the success of such
strategies. Indeed, in their study, Bozkaya and Kerr show that strict
labor regulations are associated with lower levels of private equity
investments. 264 Additionally, one would expect that the effect of
flexible labor regulations would be even more pronounced in cases of
private equity investment in state-owned companies.
Labor
restructurings feature predominantly when turning around companies
with higher labor costs. Labor unions and politicians collude, using
state-owned companies in order to promote their self interest.
CONCLUSION
The Financial Crisis, the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in the
U.S., and the AIFM Directive in the E.U., and the run of Mitt Romney
for President of the United States have put a spotlight on the private
equity industry on both continents. This article has attempted to offer a
comparative examination of the financing and structuring of public-toprivate transactions as well as the regulation of private equity firms in
the U.S. and Europe. This assessment reveals a particularly restrictive
legal regime for transactions and firms in Europe, leading one to expect
a corresponding effect on the development of the European private
equity market. However, to the contrary, underlying economic forces
have provided and will continue to provide a boost to European private
equity activity. Thus, when it comes to European private equity, there is
no causal link between the strictness of the legal regime and economic
development. Rather, economic development shapes its own path,
unaffected by the prevailing legal regime.

international/europe/crisis-ridden-southern-europe-is-rapidly-reforming-labor-laws-a827797.html.
264. Ant Bozkaya & William R. Kerr, Labor Regulations and European Private
Equity (Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management, Working Paper No. 08043, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1527168.

